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On 'Essentially’ ( ’ öitep ' ) in Aristotle
In this paper I shall examine the notion of ταώτόν ■— commonly 
translated as 'same' or 'identical'— and its relevance to so-called 
essential predications, as effected through the use of 'δπερ ’ in 
Aristotle. It will be shown that propositions of the type Ά  is 0Π£ρ 
B' Involve an essential predication where either a genus is affirmed 
of a species, or a species of an individual. The possibility of 
such predications will be founded upon the doctrine of the 
categories and the ontological distinction between essence and 
accident. Besides predications involving generic or specific 
Identity, others effected through propositions of the type Ά  
is δπερ B* will be seen to be employed by Aristotle. These latter 
predications will be stricto sensu neither essential nor accidental, 
yet will involve a necessary connection between subject and 
predicate. I shall then examine why Aristotle believes there to be 
a necessary application of predicate to subject in these cases, as 
well as why certain problems of identity and synonymy follow 
therefrom.
Let us begin then by observing the various senses that Aristotle 
ascribes to 'ταύτόυ · . In Topics 17 he asserts:
First of all we must distinguish the various meanings of 'the 
same'. In general, 'sameness' would seem to fall into three 
divisions; for we usually speak of numerical, specific and 
generic sameness. There is numerical sameness when there is 
more than one name for the same thing, e.g. 'mantle' and 
'cloak'. There is specific sameness when there are several 
things but they do not differ in species, e.g. one man and 
another man, one horse and another horse; for such things as 
fall under the same species are said to be specifically the 
same. Similarly things are generically the same when they 
fall under the same genus, e.g. horse and man (1).
Top. 103a6-14 (trans. by Forster).1/
Further on he adds:
The term ’the same' seems to be applied with the most general 
acceptance of everyone to that which is numerically one. But 
even this is usually employed in several senses. Its 
principal and primary sense occurs when sameness is applied 
to a name or a definition, e.g. when a ’cloak’ is said to be 
the same as a ’mantle', or, when ’a biped pedes trian animal ' 
is said to be the same as a 'man'. A second sense occurs 
when sameness is applied to a property, e.g. when ’capable of 
receiving knowledge' is said to be the same as ’man’, and 
’that which is naturally carried upwards' is said to be the 
same as 'fire'. A third sense occurs when the sameness is 
based on an accident, e.g., when 'that which is seated* or 
'that which is musical' is said to be the same as 
'Socrates'. All thèse uses aim at Indicating numerical 
oneness (2).
I do not intend here to comment upon each of the possible ways in 
which 'ταύτόν ' is said here to have meaning. For the moment, I 
should like only to draw attention to the first type of numerical 
sameness, viz. that which is said to exist between 'mantle' and 
'cloak'. Both are said to possess numerical sameness in spite of 
their difference as individual terms, for they share the same 
definition. As we shall see later on, this second type of numerical 
sameness presupposes a certain form of synonymy the importance of 
which must be recognized when analyzing the necessary but 
non-essential predications of the form Ά  is δπερΒ'.
To gain a clearer idea as to how ' δπερ ' may be employed in 
statements affirming sameness or identity, let us consider the 
senses that Liddell, Scott and Jones (hereafter referred to as LSJ) 
ascribe to this term from the standpoint of Artistotle's logic:
In the logic of Aristotle, δαερ έστί , or αηερ alone, has two 
senses: a. non-technical, and unemphatic, what (a thing)
is, έκάστη ουσία τσΟθ* δ. έστίν, ού λέγεται μδλλσν καί Tftrov 
each substance is called what it i_s without the difference of 
more or less, Cat. 3b36; το διπλάσιου τσυθ* δ. έστίν, 
έτέρου λέγεται the double is called
what it (viz. the double) of something, i.e. is relative, 
ib.6a39. b. expressing identity, Ούτε ή χιών δ. λευκόν snow is 
not what white is, i.e., is not identical with white. Top.
120b23; δ λευκδςΐϊνθρωπος σύκ έστιν δ. χρώμα ib.H6a27:
hence, to indicate the precise or essential nature of a 
thing, ού γάρ &v <ραίη δ. κακόν τι είναι"Tflv ήδσνήν he would
not say that pleasure is essentially something bad, EN
2/ Top. 103 a 23-31 (trans. by Forster)
31153b6; τα μεν σύσίαν σημαίνοντα δ. έκεινο fi δ. έκεινό τι. 
σημαίνει expressions which show the essence show precisely 
what the thing in question ij3 or precisely of what kind it ijs 
Ti.e. indicate either its species or its genus) , APo. 83 a 
24; δ. <£0δε^>τί έστι το τί f¡v είναι the essence of a thing
1s precisely a 'this*, i.e. fully specified particular, 
Metaph. 1030 a 3; f| μεν [ έπιστήμη ] δ. άνδρώπσυ έστίν knowledge 
(that man is an animal) is apprehension that 'animal' is an 
element in the essential nature of man, APo. 89 a 35 (3).
I should like now to examine the examples cited by LSJ in their 
definition of the term ' δπερ' in its unemphatic form (sense a.). In 
both examples 'δπερ ' appears in its conventional relative pronominal 
form. The predicate 'not being susceptible of more or less' is 
affirmed of the subject 'essence', similarly, the predicate 'being 
said of something else' is affirmed of the subject 'double'. Each 
of these examples reveals that a specific subject, insofar as it is 
what it is, possesses a specific predicate. Further, it is safe to 
assume that in each of these predications the application of the 
predicate to the subject occurs necessarily. What must be 
determined, however, is whether ' oô λέγεται μάλλον χαΐ* ήττσν ' 
applies essentially to 'οδσία ’ and whether ' έτέρου λέγεται * applies 
essentially to ' τιρδς τι ' and hence to 'διπλάσιαν ’. Now it must be 
observed that essential predicates ( χατηγομρούμενα χαθ'αύτά ), i.e. 
those that are affirmed έν χφ τί έστι of their subjects (4) are 
basically of two sorts: generic and specific (5). Further, it is
according to the order of genus and species that the predicates of 
the category of essence as well as those of the accidental 
categories are classified. It is by virture of such a 
classification and of the irreducible particularity of each category 
that one can rightly claim, e.g., that man is essentially an animal 
but only accidentally white. The essence-accident distinction 
therefore implies not only the categorical differences between 
substances, qualities, quantities, etc., but also the hierarchical 
order présent in each category according to which the predicates of 
greater intension are subsumed under those of greater extension. In 
the light of these brief remarks, I think it can be easily seen that
—/ A Greek-English Lexicon, ed. H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, H.S.
Jones, Oxford, l$6l, pT 1262.
Cf. An. post. 73 a 34-35.
1/ Cf. An. post. 92 a 6-7; Top. 101 b 18-19, 108 b 22-23, 139 a
29-31, 143 b 8-9, 153 a 18, 154 a 27; Met. 1022 a 25-29, 1029 b 
13-14, 1030 a 11-13, 1037 a 29.
4’not being susceptible of more or less' does not apply essentially 
to 'essence'. For if the contrary were true, then 'essence' would 
be merely a definite species of a higher genus, an extensionally 
greater categorical determination under which 'essence' would be 
subsumed. As for 'double', it is already a specification of the 
class of things called relatives, which Aristotle sets apart in the 
following manner:
We call relatives all such things as are said to be just what 
they are, of or than other things, or in some other way in 
relation to something else (6).
Now what is affirmed here of 'relative' certainly applies to 
'double' essentially, insofar as 'relative' is the genus of 
'double'. It does not follow from this, however, that 'being said 
of something else' applies to 'relative' essentially, i.e. in the 
same way as 'relative' applies to 'double'. For otherwise 'double' 
would be a species of 'relative' (which it is) and 'relative* would 
be a species of a higher genus (which it is not).
The problem that must now be addressed is that of the manner in 
which the predicates 'not being susceptible of more or less' and 
'being said of something else' apply to'essence' and 'relative' 
respectively, since they cannot do so essentially. The most 
appropriate solution to this problem would seem to be that they 
apply to their subjects as properties (Côia )· For properties, as 
Aristotle states in the Topics, are not predicated essentially of 
their subjects, yet are co-extensive with them and belong to them 
always and of necessity (7). The classic example of a property as 
defined by Aristotle is that of man's capacity to acquire the art of 
reading and writing (8). This property is certainly related to 
man's specific difference, viz. rationality, but unlike this latter, 
is not partaken of by the subject —  the subject being considered 
here from the point of view of his specific essence — , i.e. is not 
a constitutive element of the definition of the subject (9).
Further, Aristotle does in fact ascribe C6ta to the ulimate 
categorical determinations of ' ούσ£α ' and 'ττιοόόν '· The property of 
any ούσ£α is that, while numerically one and the same, it is able to 
take on contraries (10); the property of any ττοσόν is that it is
6/
7/
8/
9/
Cat . 6 a 36-37 (trans. by Ackrill).
Cf. Top. 102 a 19-22, 129a 24-26, 131 a 27-31,
Cf. Top. 102 a 20-22.
Cf. Top. 132 b 35-133 a 3.
10/
131 b 30-32.
Cf. Cat 4 a 10-11
5able to be called either equal or unequal (11). But in ascribing 
properties to ultimate genera of being Aristotle does not fully free 
himself of the implication that in some manner a superior genus and 
specific differences are required to delimit the meanings of these 
genera. For it is the case that a property can be designated as 
such only in contradistinction to essence, just as a species is 
necessarily contrasted with its genus and an accident with the 
substance in which it is found. But what would be the essence of 
the ultimate genus 'essence* against which a given attribute 'x' 
could be compared and set apart as a property? How could one even 
hope to grant linguistic expression to such an essence, assuming it 
could be determined, given the final form of the Aristotelean 
doctrine of categories? It should be observed in this connection 
that, according to Aristotle, it is only the essential (καθ* αύτά ) 
and permanent (άει) properties that apply necessarily and at all 
times to their subjects (12). So a distinction not only between 
essence and property, but also between essential and non-essential 
properties is implied in the ascription of a property to a subject 
with which it is said to be co-extensive. Furthermore, in the first 
book of the Topics, when Aristotle presents his famous list of the 
predicables, he points out that the ίδιαν can be of two sorts: the
first, which expresses the t£ fív είναι of a subject, is more 
appropriately called the definition (δρος ); the second, which 
expresses a predicate merely co-extensive with the subject, is more 
rightly called a property (13). Finally, in Topics V Aristotle 
affirms that a property is correctly assigned to a subject only if 
it can be shown to apply to it naturally■(φύσει ) (14).
The point of the foregoing remarks is the following. To say that a 
predicate applies either essentially or as a property to an ulimate 
genus of being presuppoes that there is an essence of that genus.
But it is exactly this presupposition that cannot be made since 
ultimate genera of being have no essences yet, qua genera, are the 
fundamental bases of the specific essences of which they are 
affirmed. At best one might maintain that ultimate genera are their 
own essences, which is the equivalent of the contention that they 
are no essences at all, since they are not the product of the 
information of genera by specific differences which would give rise 
to their specific essential being (15). It follows then that the
w Cf
12/ Cf
13/ Cf
14/ Cf
15/ Cf
Cat. 6 a 
Top. 129 
Top. 101 
Top. 134 
Top. 143
26-27. 
a 17-26. 
b 19-22. 
b 5-7. 
b 8-9.
6predicates ’not being susceptible of more or less' and 'being said 
of something else' cannot apply, properly speaking, χατ* tÔLCtv 
or êv χψ τC έσχι, to 'ούσΰα ' and ' npÓQ Tt ' respectively. Hence in 
the two examples of the unemphatic sense of the term 'δπερ ' cited by 
LSJ, this term is not employed to indicate a strict or well-defined 
application of a predicate to a subject according to the modes of 
essence or property.
I should now like to turn to sense b of ' δπερ' which, according to 
LSJ, expresses identity. My purpose here will be to determine 
whether in this sense the term 'δπερ ' may be employed
1) to effect only a single form of essential predication;
2) to effect predictions that cannot rightly be called 
essential.
Concerning point 1 it is important to remember that according to 
Aristotle essential predications involve the application of either a 
generic predicate to a term representative of a species, or of a 
species-term to an individual subject. Further, it is of interest 
to notice that Aristotle does not distinguish between the functions 
of the copula in these two types of predication. It thus becomes 
possible to follow certain syllogistic forms of reasoning, as does 
Aristotle in the following text of the Categories :
For example, man is predicated of the individual man, and 
animal of man; so animal will be predicated of the individual 
man also— for the individual man is both a man and an animal 
(16).
Now it is a well-known fact that in the history of logic Peano first 
distinguished between the relation of an individual to its class and 
the inclusion of one class in another (17). This distinction is 
concisely illustrated by Russell:
For example, the relation of the Greek nation to the human 
race is different from that of Socrates to the human race, 
and the relation of the whole of the primes to the whole of 
the numbers is different from that of 2 to the whole of the 
numbers (18).
i—/ Cat. 1 b 12-15 (trans. by Ackrill).
•iZ^  Cf. J. Vuillemin, De la logigue a la théologie: cinq etudes
sur Aristote, Paris, 1967, p. 55.
A—  ^ B. Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, 2nd edition, 
London, 1938, p. 134.
7The immediate consequence of this distinction was that any syllogism 
of the type:
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Socrates is mortal.
was demoted to the status of a pseudo-syllogism (19). It is 
certain, however, that Aristotle sees no problem in maintaining a 
unity of meaning for the verb ’to be’ in statements of the type 
'Socrates is a man’ and those of the type ’Men are mortal' Insofar 
as both statements involve the application of an essential predicate 
to a subject. The question here is whether he employs ' δπερ' in the 
sense of identity defined by LSJ, i.e., with the meaning of 
'essentially*. In the formulation of such statements.
Clear examples of what Peano understood by inclusion, and what is to 
be seen as its contrary, i.e. exclusion, are found in the two texts 
of the Topics cited by LSJ. Snow is not essentially white, i.e. is 
not a species of the genus ’white'; white man is not essentially 
color, i.e. is not a species of the genus 'color'. These two 
examples are by no means the only ones provided by the Topics in 
which ' fcnrp* is used in instances of inclusion or exclusion. On the 
contrary, as Brunschwig points out, Aristotle frequently employs the 
expression Ά  is δπερ B' in the Topics to affirm that B belongs to 
the essence of A and hence that it is the genus of A; Brunschwig 
cites seven occurrences of this expression in the Topics other than 
those indicated by LSJ (20). As regards the relation of an 
individual subject to its class, one is better served with examples 
taken from the Posterior Analytics. In I, 22 Aristotle affirms that 
when the wood undergoes a change so as to become white, it is 
incorrect to say that the white thing ( τό λευκών ) qua white or qua a 
species of white ( δπερ λευκόν τι ) has become wood, for whiteness is 
merely an accident of wood (21). This example points out that even 
if the white thing belongs to a species of white, it will be wrong 
to say that, as such, it has become wood.
19/ Cf. J. Vuillemin, op. clt., p. 55.
20/ Cf . J. Brunschwig, Aristote : Les topiques (livres I-IV),
Paris , 1967, p. 154.
21/ Cf. An . post. 83 a 4-9.
8A few lines further in the same chapter Aristotle reiterates this 
point by affirming that when the wood receives the accidental 
determination of whiteness, it does so, not qua anything else, but 
qua wood or a species of wood ( ft δττερ ζύλον ft' ξύλον τι ) (22).
It is thus clear that ’ örtep ’ in the sense of ’essentially* is used 
by Aristotle to effect predications from the individual standpoints 
of genus and species, i.e. is used to designate instances of two of 
the three principal typés of sameness or identity indicated in the 
text of the Topics cited at the beginning of this paper. But it is 
also used to designate, if only partially, an instance of the third 
form of *tafrrôv ’» i*e. that according to number. For things may be 
numerically the same by virture of definition, and definition, in 
expressing the essence of a thing, reveals the determination of a 
definite species in a particular genus (23).
I should now like to turn to my second point raised with regard to 
the sense of ’δπερ * indicating identity, i.e. the question as to 
whether ’οπερ * may be used in this sense without the meaning of 
’essentially’. Let us examine in this connection the text of the 
Metaphysics cited by LSJ, i.e. 1030 a 3. In this text 
the tC ftv είναι Is said to be örtep [τόόε ] τι (24). In the light of 
LSJ’s translation of this text, it is clear that ’thisness’ or 
determinateness or definiteness is affirmed of the x¿ ftv είναι . It 
is in relatively similar fashion that this text is rendered in 
Bonitz’s German translation:
Denn das Sosein is ein einzelnes Etwas (25).
The same is true of Tricot’s French translation.
En effet, la quidditë d’un être est son essence individuelle
et déterminée (26).
22/ cf. An. post. 83 a 12-14.
23/ Cf. An. post. 90b 30-31; Top. 130b 2-6, 139 a 29-35, 143 b 
6-10, 19-22; Met. 1031 a 12.
2^/ Ross, contrary to Bonitz, reads δπερ γ<5ρ τ£ in Met. 1030 a 3, 
but argues for the synonymy of τι and τόόε τι » cf Aristotle *a 
Metaphysics, Oxford, 1924, Vol. II, p. 170.
25/ Aristotles’ Metaphysik, griech.-dt./ in der Übers, von Η. 
Bonitz; hrsg. von H. Seidel, 2 Halbbd., Hamburg, 1980.
Aristote: La métaphysique, 2 vol.,
1970.
26/ trad. J. Tricot, Paris,
9Ross, who reads the text somewhat differently, translates: 
For the essence is precisely what something ^s (27).
It is interesting to note that in the cited translations of Met.
1030 a 3 'δπερ ' is either not translated (Bonitz), translated 
substantively in connection with f τόδε] τι (Tricot) or translated 
as ’precisely'· There is hence a hesitation on the part of the 
translators to render ’ δπερ’ as 'essentially' - a hesitation I 
believe to be well justified. For how could 'τι ' , τάδε τι « Dr any 
predicate 'x' be affirmed essentially of 'essence', if there can be 
nothing more fundamental than essence (28)? Indeed, as I pointed 
out in my remarks on the unemphatic sense of ' δπερ ’, essence is not 
itself a determinate species of being of which attributes could be 
affirmed essentially. Further, it is interesting to observe that in 
the same chapter of Met. Z in which 1030 a 3 appears, Aristotle 
explicity denies that there may be an essence of anything that 
cannot be determined as a species of a genus. The name (δνσμα ) of 
anything incapable of such a determination will at best have a 
formula ( λόγος) indicating its meaning, but as such will have no 
specific definition (ορισμός ), nor will it serve to designate 
anything having an essence (29). It thus follows that in accordance 
with the strict sense of 'essence’ as regards attributions of 
identity, the τί ?ίν είναι is not essentially a 'this' and that in 
Me¿. 1030 a 3 'δπερ' is not employed to designate an instance of 
generic or specific identity. Further, even if one were to retain 
the translations of LSJ or Ross, there would still remain the 
problem of determining the basis upon which essence would be 
precisely a 'this' or precisely what something is.
I thus should like to go beyond the definition of 'δπερ' 
provided by LSJ and call this particular sense of 'δπερ' 
non-essential identity that of 'indeterminate identity'.
27/ Aristotle: Metaphysics. Oxford trans. of W.D. Ross in The
Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. R. McKeon, New York, 1941” The 
stress on 'is' is that of Ross. The text of Ross as revised 
by J. Barnes reads: "For the essence is what something is,"
cf. The Collected Works of Aristotle, Princeton, 1984.
28/ cf. Met. 1029 a 13-14.
29/ cf. Met. 1030 a 11-17.
(sense b) 
indicating
10
It le ln my view Indeterminate since In statements such as that of 
Met. 1030 a 3 neither a generic nor specific identity is expressed, 
nor a fortiori one of definition. Nor does it seem at all possible 
that merely an accidental identity is implied. And as to whether 
*ftrorp ' is employed in Met. 1030 a 3 to attribute a property to 
essence, I should draw attention here to my remarks made previously 
in reference to the unemphatic sense of ' δπερ · to urge that it 
cannot. It is thus apparent that when employed in this specific 
sense, ’ δπερ' expresses a type of identity that is not at all 
attested in the passage of the Topics cited at the beginning of this 
paper.
It is important to recognize that' Met ♦ 1030 a 3 is not an isolated 
case of statements expressing indeterminate identity. There are 
certainly other instances of ’ δπερ · having this sense to be found in 
the Aristotelean Corpus. I shall point out here only three others, 
each found in the Metaphysics, as well as the various translations 
of the passages in which they appear:
1) . Met.
l(TÜ3b32-33 : δ* ή έκδοτου oúcrCa έν έστι,ν ού κατα
συμβεβηχός, δμοέως δε και δπερ δν tl.
Ross: And if, further, the substance of each thing is
one in no merely accidental way, and similarly is from 
its very nature something that is.
Bonitz: Auch ist jedes Wesen eines, nicht bloss in
akzidentellem Sinne, und ebenso 1st es seiend an sich.
Tricot: De plus, la substance de chaque être est une,
et cela non par accident, et de même elle est aussi, 
essentiellement, quelque chose qui existe.
2) . Met_. 1045a36-1045b2 :δαχ δέ'μή έχει ύλην/ μήτε νοητην
μήτε αόσθητήν, εύθυς δπερ έν τι (εΓναιΓ] έστι,ν έκαστον, 
ώσπερ καί δπερ δν τι, το τδδε, τ<5" holóv, τδ ποαόν.
Ross: But of the things which have no matter, either
intelligible or perceptible, each is by its nature 
essentially a kind of unity, as it is essentially a 
kind of being— individual substance, quality, or 
quantity.
11
Bonitz: Was aber keinen Stoff hat, weder denkbaren,
noch sinnlich wahrnehmbaren, das 1st unmittelbar das, 
was Eines 1st, so wie auch das, was Seindes 1st, 
nämlich das bestimmte Etwas, das Qualitative, das 
Quantitative.
Tricot: Quant aux choses qui n'ont pas de matière,
soit Intelligible, soit sensible, c'est immédiatement 
et essentiellement un être, soit substance, soit 
qualité, soit quantité.
3) . Met. 1051b-30-32: δαα δή éottv δπερ είναι τι wat 
ΐνεργεύςι, περί ταϋτα ουκ έστιν άπατηθ^ ναι άλλ* ff 
voetv ff μή.
Ross: About the things, then, which are essences and
actualities, it is not possible to be in error, but 
only to know them or not to know them.
Bonltz: Bei dem also, was ein Sein an sich und ln
Wirklichkeit ist, ist keine Täuschung möglich, sondern \ 
nur Denken (vernunf tmässiges Erfassen) oder Nichtdenken.
Tricot: Pour tout ce qui est précisément une essence
et qui existe en acte, il ne peut donc y avoir erreur; 
il y a seulement, ou il n y a pas, connaissance de ces 
. . ■ ■ êtres.
In the first text the subject clearly is ούσία , while that of the 
second is the first three ultimate genera of being, and that of the 
last actual essences. In the lines immediately following those of 
the second above-cited text of the Metaphysics Aristotle explicitly 
states that neither ' το δν' nor *το δν ' represents the genus or 
figures in the definition of ' το τόδε *, ' τδ tiolóv ' or ’ το ποσόν ’
(30). Moreover, it is interesting to notice the variety of 
translation in each of the three texts. At times 'δπερ* is not 
translated at all; at other times it is translated as 'precisely', 
'immediately' or even.'essentially *. This reveals, I believe, the 
difficulty of the reader of Aristotle to determine exactly the 
manner in which a subject S that, properly speaking, cannot be said 
to possess an essence, is x qua δπερ x. And if one is to urge that S 
is immediately or precisely x, how then is one to convincingly 
defend Aristotle against the charge that the immediacy or precision 
of x!s application to S is in fact based on nothing more than flat, 
convention or arbitrary judgment? Could it not be further argued.
12
in recollection of Rant 's criticism of Aristotle » that in the case 
of the attribution of immediate predicates to ulimate genera of 
being, not only this attribution, but also the establishment of the 
table of the ultimate genera of being in its final form is the 
expression not of a system, but rather a mere rhapsody (31).
I do not wish to imply here that Aristotle does not attempt to offer 
any justification of.the attribution of a predicate to a subject by 
means of ' δπερ' in the sense of indeterminate identity. On the 
contrary, in defence of his claim at 1030 a 3 he affirms that 
the τί fiv είναι is not a predicate which is asserted of a subject 
other than itself. At 1003b 32-33 ούσία is said to be δπερ δν τι in 
the same manner as it is one, i.e. non-accidentally. According to 
the assertion made at 1045 a 36-1045 b 2 ultimate genera of being 
are δπερ δν τι and δπερ δν τι since they have neither intelligible 
nor sensible matter. And in conformity with Aristotle's statement 
at 1051b 30-32, things which are δπερ είναι τι καί ένέργειαι are
those about which one cannot be mistaken. The point that I wish to 
underline, however, is that Aristotle offers us no way to determine 
why the reasons adduced for the applications of the above-cited 
predicates to their respective subjects are in fact sufficient for 
the necessity of these applications.
There are other problems which follow from Aristotle’s use of 'δπερ ' 
in the sense of indeterminate identity that are worthy of our 
attention. For example, let us consider again the text of Met. 1030 
a 3. In this text it is affirmed that the xt fiy είναι is 
immediately or precisely a 'this' . And here 'thisness ' should be 
viewed not as the physical determinateness proper to a composite 
substance, but rather as the determinateness proper to that which is 
presupposed by the definition of all non-essential terms, yet does 
hot figure in their definition as either a generic or specific 
element (32). In other words, the xi fiv είναι is said to be a
10/ cf. Met. 1045 b 2-5.
■âj/ Cf. I. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, (traps. 
L.W. Beck), Indianapolis, 195Ö, p. 7Ö.
Ü /  Cf. Met. 1029 b 22-1030 a 3, 1030 a 27-1030 b6.
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•this* Insofar as it possesses a focal meaning upon which the 
meanings of the other categories are based (33). The fact that 
Aristotle is here referring to conceptual rather than physical 
thisness is illustrated by what he says in 1030 a 4-5. The white 
man is not 0περ τόδε τι . This is consonant with Aristotle’s view 
that ’white man* is not an essence, since man is not essentially 
white (34). However, if Aristotle were speaking here from the 
perspective of the Categories, he certainly would be constrained to 
say that the white man is immediately a τόδε τι , for the expression 
’white man' refers to a primary substance and a primary substance by 
its very nature is τόδε τι (35). Nevertheless, Aristotle’s use of 
*τόδε ' and ’ τόδε TL ' in lines 1030 a 3-6 seems to me consistent and 
to indicate the meaning of conceptual and not physical 
determinateness (36). Hence, when in 1030 a 5-6 he affirms 
that το τόδε belongs only to ταις oûoCats , I read him as attributing 
conceptual determinateness to essences and not physical 
determinateness to substances. Moreover, there is no apparent 
reason to believe that the attribution of ’[τόδε Jri 1 
to τί f|V είναι is any more immediate or complete than that 
of το τόδε to ταΐς ουσ(αις , If this reading is correct, then the 
question of the synonymy of ’ τί ?Jv είναι · and ’ οόσ£α · arises. For 
if both are immediately a ’this' and it is only ούσ£αι that possess 
thisness, then there would seem to be a ground upon which to base 
the claim that ' τ£ ?¡v είναι * and * ουσία * are indeed, synonymous, 
even though at times translators render the former as ’quiddity' and 
the latter as 'essence'.
It is important to observe here that Aristotle's statements on the 
question of synonymy are not altogether consistent. For example, in 
the Categories he declares that things are synonymous when they 
share the same name and definition:
Strictly speaking it is oCxsia which is said to have a focal 
meaning with respect to the other categories. Nevertheless, 
το τί 7¡v είναι is said to belong especially to οόσία (cf. Met. 
1031 a 12-14; 1030 a 29-30). On the question of focal meaning 
in Aristotle's categories, cf. G.E.L. Owen, "Logic and 
Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle," in Aristotle 
and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, Goteborg, 1960, p. 169.
Ü /  Cf. Met. 1030 a 1-2. ' ■
Cf. Cat. 3 b 10. ;
-âÜ/ On the possibility of expressing either a conceptual or
physical determinateness by means of ' τόδε τι', cf. J.A. Smith, 
" Τόδε τι i“ Aristotle," The Classical Review, 1921, p. 19.
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Thus, for example, both a man and an ox are animals. 
Each of these Is called, by a common name, an animal, 
and the definition of being is also the same; for if 
one is to give the definition of each —  what being an 
animal is for each of them —  one will give the same 
definition (37).
However, in the Rhetoric, he affirms that two different terms can be 
called synonymous if they share the same meaning;
Synonyms are useful to the poet, by which I mean words 
whose ordinary meaning is the same, e.g. τιοεύεσται 
(advancing) andßaö££tiv (proceeding); these two are 
ordinary words and have the same meaning (38).
If we follow Aristotle’s view of synonymy expressed in the Rhetoric 
passage, then two synonymous terms, by virture of their identical 
meaning, will* share the same definition and hence possess a 
numerical identity, as was seen to be true of 'cloak' and 'mantle* 
in the text of the Topics dealing with identity cited at the 
beginning of this paper. Further, this view of synonymy allows for 
the verification of such a numerical identity through the 
determination of the identity of the genera and specific differences 
employed in the definition of each term. Now we have observed that 
Aristotle employs the expression Ά  is δπερ B' in certain instances 
to Indicate that B is the genus of A. So if in such an instance 
another term C were also δπερ B, it would follow that A and C would 
possess generic identity. And if it could be shown that their 
specific differences were the same, then they could be said to be 
synonymous.
An obvious problem, however, arises when in an expression based on 
'Ais δπερ B ', i . e. ' το> δπερ B’, B is replaced by ' τόόε τι '. For
insofar as * τόόε τι ' does not refer to a genus of which there could 
be particular species, it would be difficult to determine to what 
specifically it refers in a given instance, even if it must refer to 
that which is δπερ τόόε τι , i.e., τ£ fjv είναι , οόσύα or 
perhaps είδος (39). Hence with regard to a text such as that of
12. Cat. 1 a 8-12 (trans. by Ackvill).
—  Rhet « 1404b 37-1405 a 2 (trans. by Roberts). On Aristotle's 
Inconsistencies regarding the question of synonymy, cf. J. 
Hintikka, "Aristotle on the Ambiguity of Ambiguity" in Time and 
Necessity: Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality, Oxford,
W 3 ,  p. 9. “    —
11 Cf. Met. 1017 b 24-26.
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Topics 116a 23, there is no a priori reason for asserting that 
'το οττερ τόδε τι ' refers specifically to a τι ?¡v είναι rather than 
an οόσία or an είδος , even if it does refer to a concept and not a 
thing, in this particular instance 'justice' and not the just man. 
And this is why translators of Aristotle read ’ τό δτιερ τόδε τι ' as 
implying alternatively the general sense, idea or definition of that 
which it designates (40). Similarly, in the light of Met♦ 1045 a 
36-1045b2 it is correct to say that ' το δπερ ëv ' and ' τό δπερ δν ' 
may be used to designate any of the categories. But Insofar as 'ëv ' 
and 'σν' are not generic terms predicable of species which could be 
distinguished on the basis of specific differences, the synonymy or 
equivocity of terms designated by ' το ΰπερ ëv ’ and ' τδ δτιερ δν ' will 
remain indeterminable. For it to be otherwise, one would have to 
appeal to the notion of essential identity and thereby presuppose 
the notions of genus, species and definition.
It is thus my conclusion that when used in the sense of 
indeterminate identity in statements of the form Ά  is δτιερ B' and 'C 
is δτιερ B δτιερ ' is not to be translated as 'essentially' and that 
the question of the synonymy of A and C in such statements is to be 
viewed as undecidable. This of course does not mean that Aristotle 
never implies in his writings an identity of meaning applying to 
terms such as 'τ ί fiv είναι ', ' οόσία' and ' είδος '.
It is rather the contrary that is true. But I do find it 
significant that in a book of the Metaphysics such as Z where 
Aristotle distinguishes between το τί ήν είναι and το είδος in order 
to better determine what οόσία is, in the last chapter of this book 
he sees no obstacle to the implicit affirmation of their identity, 
as if this were not fundamentally problematic:
φανερόν τοινυν δτι ζητεΤ τδ αΓτιον* τούτο δ 'έστί το τ ί fív
είνα ι ( 41) ; άστε το α ίτιον ζητείται της
όλης ( τούτο δ'έστί τδ είδος ) φ τί έστιν* τούτο δ* ή οόσία (42).
40
41
42
Commenting upon the expression ^"δπερ τόδε τ ι
affirms : 
concrète, 
comme une
Quant à τόδε τι , il ne désigne pas
Brunschwig 
la substance
comme ailleurs chez Aristote; il faut le 
sorte de variable, qui désigne cela meme
est question 
qui s'exhibe
dans les 
en elles
considérer 
dont il 
de sen
154-55) "
notions considérées, le noyau 
(J. Brunschwig, ££. cit ♦, pp 
P. Gohleke asserts: "Der Ausdruck ' δτιερ τόδε τ ι '  stammt au
Aristotles' akademischer Zeit und bedeutet eigentlich die 
eines Gegenstandes (P. Gohlke, Aristotles: Topik, Paderbo
1952, pp. 332-33).” As for C. Arpe, he argues: "Die Form
δπερ τόδε τ ι  ist mehrdeutig; durch sie wird entweder 
definitorische Identifikation ausgedrückt, odpr aber 
Identifikation mit einem Ding, streng im Slnnè der ersten 
Kategorie.. .Also an sich, ist die Formel δτιερ ΐόδε τ ι  j
indifferent gegen Kategoriale Unterscheidungen; sie bezeichnet) 
die definitorische Identification, und ob es sich bei der 
Definition um ein Ding handelt oder nicht, spielte ursprünglich 
jedenfalls keine Rolle (Das τί fjv ε ίν α ι bei Aristotles, 
Hamburg, 1938, pp. 34-3577” “
Met. 1041 a 27-28.
Met. 1041 b 7-9.
